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DELIVERING VALUE-FOR-MONEY IN THE OPERATING PHASE 
OF PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP: INTERVIEW FINDINGS 
Steven McCann, Guillermo Aranda-Mena and Peter J. Edwards 
ABSTRACT 
Although it is the responsibility of private consortia to deliver agreed services under 
Public Private Partnership arrangements, government is accountable to tax payers for 
achieving Value-for-Money. The public partner must therefore provide effective con-
tract management oversight during the operating phase to ensure intended outcomes 
are attained. Literature review is used to identify issues relating to Value-for-Money 
achievement. These are then explored through interviews with 34 senior public and pri-
vate partner industry representatives from Australia and the United Kingdom. Key in-
terview findings relate to the adoption of a flexible approach for achieving Value-for-
Money; techniques for assessing Value-for-Money during the operating phase; and the 
importance of improving public employee capability and expertise in delivering Value-
for-Money outcomes. Effective oversight by the public partner in managing Public Pri-
vate Partnership contracts will increase the likelihood that intended Value-for-Money 
outcomes are achieved in practice. 
Keywords – Operating Phase, Operational Governance, PPP, Procurement, Public 
Partner, VfM 
INTRODUCTION 
There is no all-encompassing definition for Public Private Partnership (PPP) (Depart-
ment of the Parliamentary Library 2003, p.2; New South Wales Parliament 2006, p.9) 
within general discourse or scholarly literature (English 2008, p.2; Urio 2010, p.26). 
There is, however, a plethora of characterisations. Some highlight the transactional na-
ture of PPP, whereby contracts are entered into between the public and private partners, 
with consortia typically providing design, financing and/or construction and the delivery 
of services in exchange for publically-owned assets or user fees (Bloomfield 2006; 
Leiringer 2006). 
Other interpretations, whilst acknowledging the transaction base, broaden the scope to 
include a ‘working together approach’ that relies upon co-operation to meet objectives 
in return for mutual gain through the sharing of risks, costs, resources and responsibili-
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ties (Klijn and Teisman 2003; Koppenjan 2005). For this paper, PPP is characterised as 
a collaborative endeavour (Smyth and Edkins 2006) involving public and private part-
ners, developed through the expertise of each partner in order to meet identified public 
needs through appropriate resource, risk and reward allocation (Canadian Council for 
Public Private Partnerships 2009). 
The Public Sector Comparator (PSC) is a hypothetical financial model used by govern-
ments to test the advantages (if any) of using private finance (Department of the Parlia-
mentary Library 2003, p.7; National Audit Office 2009, p.46). The PSC estimates the 
total cost of a project’s construction and operations (Allen Consulting Group 2006, 
p.19) against the expected costs of using other procurement methods (Grimsey and 
Lewis 2004, p.137) to determine the best Value-for-Money (VfM) proposition (Infra-
structure Australia 2008, p.35). It is based on the most efficient (New South Wales 
Government 2001, p.45) and/or recent (Partnerships Victoria 2001b, p.6) method of 
determining VfM proposals (New South Wales Government 2001, p.45). Discounted 
cash flow modelling, usually through the calculation of Net Present Value, is normally 
the predominant quantitative tool for analysis, but qualitative assessment is not exclud-
ed. 
PSC assessment, which is undertaken alongside the development of a project brief, con-
tract and project specifications (Partnerships Victoria, 2001b, p.6), takes account of the 
likely project risks that are expected to be transferred to the private partner as well as 
those anticipated to be retained by the public partner (New South Wales Government 
2001, p.45; Partnerships Victoria 2001b, p.7). In terms of operations, this means operat-
ing risk is transferred to the private partner. Willingness to accept these risks by the pri-
vate partner may be encouraged through the use of incentives (Commonwealth Depart-
ment of Administration and Finance 2006, p.2) such as defined quarterly service pay-
ments, or reducing royalty payments for higher levels of user demand. At the comple-
tion of the PSC test, if the PPP option is deemed to be cheaper in comparison with al-
ternative procurement models, a PPP concession will be awarded to the private consor-
tium that makes the best bid. 
Broadly speaking, Western governments are advanced in the design and delivery meth-
ods of PPP as a viable, alternative form of procurement, thought to be suitable for a 
range of large-scale economic and social infrastructure projects. Whilst advanced in the 
early phases of the project lifecycle, most Australian state governments (since PPPs 
tend to be secured at state, rather than at federal level in Australia) are still developing 
effective approaches to achieving VfM outcomes during the operational phase of PPPs. 
To date, this has proved difficult because of the long-term nature of these arrangements 
(typically lasting upwards of 20 years) and the fact that few contracts have yet reached 
maturity in terms of the original concession period. 
To achieve VfM outcomes during operating phase, PPP contract oversight (governance) 
must be prudently managed by the public partner. Although it is the responsibility of the 
private partner to deliver agreed service(s), the public partner is ultimately responsible 
for ensuring that these services are actually carried out and that they (at least) meet min-
imum standards. Effective ongoing partnership relations between the public and private 
partners are important for dealing with unforeseen issues as and when they arise. 
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Other types of uncertainty are inherent in PPP. For the public partner, one of the main 
benefits sought from PPP is risk transfer – or more explicit allocation of risks between 
the public and private partners; however, not all operational risks can be transferred in 
practice. Therefore, governments should accept and manage their risk positions. PPPs 
are also expected to deliver real benefits to communities throughout their operational 
performance. The public partner should be pro-active in taking necessary and timely 
corrective action to encourage better private partner performance when necessary to 
ensure that planned outcomes are achieved in practice. The active management of pri-
vate partner performance, by the public partner during the operational phase of PPPs, is 
thus important. 
Following this introduction, a short literature review provides contextual background. 
This is followed by an account of the interview administration and interviewee de-
mographics. The findings are then presented and discussed. Recommendations are made 
for public sector governance practice for the operating phase of PPP. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
As with PPP, there is no single definition that fully encapsulates the concept of ‘VfM’. 
For the private partner, it may simply represent the size of its profit margins in deliver-
ing contracted services. However, for government, VfM is based on the achievement of 
planned social outcomes, and hence the ‘social dividend’, through the delivery of con-
tracted services. The New South Wales Treasury (in English 2006) offers the following 
definition for VfM: ‘getting the best possible outcome at the lowest possible price’. In 
contrast, the UK Treasury (2006, p.7) provides additional detail, defining VfM as ‘the 
optimum combination of whole-of-life costs and quality (or fitness for purpose) of the 
good or service to meet the user’s requirement’. This differs from the following defini-
tion supplied by the Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance (2011, p.19): 
‘VfM denotes, broadly, a balanced benefit measure covering quality levels, per-
formance standards, risk exposure, other policy or special interest measures, as 
well as price. Generally, VfM is assessed on a “whole of life” or “total cost of 
ownership” basis’. 
Although the other definitions take into account full lifecycle costs, (stating that price 
should only be one factor when making a VfM determination), the latter is the favoured 
definition for this paper as it refers to the need for managing both performance and risk. 
Furthermore, with the New South Wales Treasury definition, it is unclear how ‘getting 
the best possible outcome at the lowest possible price’ can be successfully applied in 
situations where there are several options under consideration and where the preferred 
option (the one that is believed to provide the best possible outcome) does not offer the 
lowest possible price. 
The achievement of VfM is considered to be one of the greatest drivers of risk transfer 
between the partners (Partnerships Victoria 2001a, p.4). It is claimed that, over time, 
this can lead to cost savings up to 66% throughout project lifecycles (Commonwealth 
Department of Administration and Finance 2006, p.2) depending on how well the PPP 
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project phases are integrated and the extent to which assets are effectively managed 
(AECOM 2007, p.41). These claims are complementary to a study undertaken by Cam-
bridge Economic Policy Associates (2005, p.39) which found that 96% of contractors 
and 85% of government officials believed that operational risks had been properly allo-
cated. However, efficient allocation may not always be realised (Asian Development 
Bank 2008, p.2). For instance, Ergas (2009) claims that poorly allocated risk may unin-
tentionally see potential cost savings turn into profits for project ‘promoters’, whist Da-
vidson (2006) argues that the cost of ‘transferring’ financial risk to the private partner 
may actually be built into partnership deals (at the tendering stage) which would obvi-
ously detract from accomplishing genuine VfM outcomes, particularly during opera-
tional phases should ongoing under-performance occur. 
Moreover, the concept of ‘VfM’ is based primarily on hypothetical calculations, often 
made at the business case stage of the project lifecycle, that may fail to fully account for 
unforeseen cost overruns or adjustments perhaps due to technical failures, obsolescence 
or lower than expected service user numbers (Edwards et al 2004, p.9; Grimsey and 
Lewis 2004, p.167; National Audit Office 2009, p.46-48). These are issues of uncertain-
ty. There may also be failure by government to provide comprehensive and realistic 
pricing of all quantifiable and material risks. Grimsey and Lewis (2004, p.144) suggest 
that these risks are often misjudged and should be part of wider risk management prac-
tices. Eventually, all procurement relies on human judgement, skills and experience 
(National Audit Office 2009, p.47) and thus becomes subject to the errors, imperfec-
tions and biases in the decision-making processes of people. A ‘solution seeking a prob-
lem’ criticism of mega-project procurement is made by Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl 
(2002) who suggest that such judgements and decisions may be deliberately biased in 
order to achieve political ends. 
In order to achieve VfM outcomes, co-operative relationships between partners must be 
established (Weihe in Hodge, Greve and Boardman 2010, p.520) as un-cooperative 
working environments (Klijn and Teisman 2003) can lead to operational difficulties 
between partners. Partnerships, therefore, should be based on establishing the ‘right’ 
working culture (Edwards, Bowen and Stewart 2005; National Audit Office 2009, p.55) 
that is beneficial to both partners and then maintaining good relations (Partnerships Vic-
toria 2003, p.16; AECOM 2007, p.75) over the life of the contract to deliver agreed out-
comes. 
Developing good working relationships between partners can decrease levels of correc-
tive action that may otherwise be taken to improve contract management outcomes 
(Ernst & Young 2008, p.13). This is important because the ‘end goal’ for PPPs is not 
cost reduction (i.e. simply abating for under-performance) – it is ensuring the private 
partner performs to the agreed standards under the contract (HM Treasury 2011, p.15) 
and that VfM is being delivered as expected. 
With regard to public partner oversight management of PPP contracts, McCann (2014) 
identifies a range of public partner partnership and performance management factors 
that may contribute towards achieving VfM outcomes during the operating phase. These 
are shown in Table 1. The documentation and/or actions that can potentially be used as 
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a foundation to build evidence-bases to assess whether VfM outcomes are being 
achieved in practice are shown in Table 2. 
Table 1: Public partner VfM contributors to PPP 
Public partner VfM contributors 
Partnership management Performance management 
Proposed corrective actions for under-performance 
are mutually agreed with the private partner and 
these actions are implemented as agreed. 
Development and continuation of productive rela-
tionships with service users, employees and applica-
ble community groups. 
Consortia informs the public partner of emerging 
risks and performance issues that have the potential 
to impact upon the achievement of planned VfM 
outcomes. 
No occurrences of negligence, fraud and/or corrup-
tion. 
Public partner employees adhere to all accountabili-
ties and responsibilities under governance, probity 
and compliance frameworks. 
Disputes are quickly resolved with little to no im-
pact on service delivery obligations and litigation is 
avoided.  
Public sector agency/departmental project obligations 
are delivered within budget and on time. 
Services are delivered in line with business 
case/project brief objectives, concession deed, service 
specifications and subsequent contract amendments. 
Agreed changes to service delivery are aligned/re-
aligned with business case/project brief objectives, 
concession deed, service specifications and subse-
quent contract amendments. 
Consistently high levels of service user and wider 
community satisfaction are reported. 
Incidences of negligence, fraud and/or corruption are 




(Source: McCann 2014) 
Table 2: Evidence-based foundations for assessing VfM for the public partner in PPP 
VfM evidence-base foundation 
Partnership management Performance management 
Progress made against partnership/stakeholder man-
agement strategies and plans e.g. assessing whether 
key messages between the public and private part-
ners or internal project teams and their working 
groups have been properly understood and complied 
with.  
Assessing public partner employees’ behaviour 
through staff appraisals to ensure they are effective-
ly discharging their duties in line with project ac-
countabilities and responsibilities e.g. the contract 
administration manual.  
Outputs comply with relevant industry standards e.g. 
assessing partnership relations that may relate to 





Project expenditure remains within prescribed budg-
etary limits.  
Achievement of VfM outcomes as defined by the 
business case/project brief objectives, concession 
deed, service specifications and subsequent contract 
amendments.  
Incident rates/Key Performance Indicator (KPI) fail-
ure rates decline.  
Public partner accountabilities and responsibilities 
relating to the contract administration manual are 
satisfactorily discharged.  
Outputs comply with relevant industry standards e.g. 
those that may relate to process improvement and 
facilities management.  
Relevant audit findings/recommendations are imple-
mented.  
Implementation of opportunity risk proposals e.g. 
innovations that lead to improved VfM outcomes. 
(Source: McCann, 2014) 
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Partnership management is here defined as ‘a relationship involving the sharing of pow-
er, work, support and/or information with others for the achievement of joint goals 
and/or mutual benefits’ (Kernaghan in Trafford and Proctor 2006), whilst performance 
management is characterised by ‘the use of inter-related strategies and activities to im-
prove the performance of individuals, teams and organisations’ (Management Advisory 
Committee 2001, p.14). 
While many operational phase issues are yet to receive widespread attention in PPP 
literature, a VfM focus is not entirely absent. One Australian example is found in the 
Melbourne CityLink project, where the Victorian State Government sought to improve 
its VfM position on this PPP project through negotiation over scope changes with the 
private concessionaire, Transurban, which led to widening of the Southern and Eastern 
sections of the toll road and an extension to the original concession period (Clayton Utz, 
2006; The Age, 2014). 
Public benefits from the road-widening have been greater traffic capacity and improved 
safety. At the same time, the Victorian State Government negotiated with Transurban 
for a 50% share of any increase in CityLink toll revenues directly attributable to im-
provement work (‘compensatory enhancement’) carried out on contiguous non-toll road 
infrastructure, i.e. improvements which have led to increased usage of CityLink. In this 
instance, improvement work carried out by the Government and completed by 2011 has 
included the creation of extra lanes on the West Gate Bridge and on the West Gate and 
Monash freeways. Negotiations and calculations over the precise amount of compensa-
tion payable by Transurban are currently underway (The Age, 2014). This VfM im-
provement should be contrasted with conditions in the original concession agreement 
for CityLink, whereby the Victorian State Government agreed to avoid making altera-
tions or traffic flow changes to roads in nearby areas that would improve alternative 
routes (‘rat runs’) and lead to greater avoidance of the toll road by road users. This ex-
ample might be construed as a shift in public thinking about VfM in PPP, from plans 
and actions designed to attract and protect private concessionaires and their risk-taking, 
towards negotiating direct compensation for public work that will yield greater returns 
for the private partner. 
A second example of VfM focus is found in a recent invitation from the Victorian De-
partment of Treasury and Finance (2012) for contributions to discussion about future 
directions for PPPs in that state. Comments have been requested that will inform poten-
tial reforms to this model for public procurement. Contemplated reforms (Victorian De-
partment of Treasury and Finance 2012, p.2) include: 
 Shifting the PSC parameters from a purely financial pass/fail test to a more 
general affordability assessment (by including more qualitative and less tangi-
ble outcome criteria and adopting a more flexible understanding of ‘affordabil-
ity’); 
 Modifying financial arrangements to improve VfM outcomes (such as the 
‘compensatory enhancement’ strategy noted above; and some level of public 
sharing in project debt financing, particularly during the construction phase); 
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 Expanding the PPP model by including additional ancillary and core services 
(e.g. including prisoner rehabilitation in prison PPPs, or combining transport 
and communications infrastructure projects where they can be physically co-
located); 
 Trialling a system of partial reimbursement of tender costs for bona fide PPP 
bidders (thereby encouraging more bidders and raising the level of competi-
tion between them); and 
 Adopting a streamlined PPP model for smaller projects (to open up the PPP 
market and attract more private participants). 
While no formal report of the responses to the Department’s invitation is available, the 
areas for discussion suggest that public sector strategic thinking about PPP is shifting to 
more diverse and flexible perceptions of VfM. 
The issues relating to the definition and achievement of VfM for the public partner in 
the operational phase of PPP are now explored in greater depth, through interviews 
conducted with appropriate experts from the public and private sectors. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research examined how PPP operational phase partnership, performance and risk 
management practices can be improved to achieve better VfM outcomes for the public 
partner. As part of the research, an integrating management model was conceptualised. 
The phenomenological research divides into two phases and employs qualitative mixed 
methods techniques. Literature review across the three management disciplines was 
used to guide the initial conceptual management model. Semi-structured interviews 
were then used to confirm the issues embraced. The interview findings informed further 
model development and a second iteration of the model was presented to an expert fo-
cus group for scrutiny and comment. Feedback from this group was used to refine the 
final iteration of the model. 
This paper focuses on the interview findings relating to expectations of VfM in PPP, 
which informed the initial iteration of the integrating model. 
Interviews were held between October 2012 and March 2013. Fifty invitations were 
distributed and 34 people (68% response rate) agreed to participate in the formal pro-
cess. Twenty-three interview participants (68%) were from the public sector and 11 
(32%) from the private sector. Seven respondents took part in a second interview. 
Statistical representativeness of the response sample is difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine since the eligible population is unknown. Against this, the sample was pur-
posively determined; the respondents all demonstrated substantial experience and 
knowledge in PPP operational management, and analysis of the responses yielded a 
‘saturation point’ i.e. a stage whereby no new significant issues or further diversity of 
answers were identified. 
The majority of the public sector interview participants were project directors. They 
have responsibility for administering the public partner’s interests in a PPP. However, a 
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range of other government employees were invited to take part, including senior execu-
tives from central agencies, government departments and statutory authorities; a com-
mercial manager; as well as a small number of PPP contract managers and a contract 
administrator. The research sample was drawn from eligible persons from the Australian 
Government, three Australian state jurisdictions and the Government of the United 
Kingdom (UK). Essentially this was a convenience sample, due to constraints of time 
and money. 
Selected private sector participants were also invited to offer insights into what they 
think the public partner should be mindful of during the operating phase of PPPs. The 
types of private sector participants included senior executives and managers responsible 
for PPP service delivery; project engineers; and partners from top-tier advisory and le-
gal firms. Many of these participants have substantial experience working in Australian 
and international PPP markets. Again, this constituted a purposive convenience sample. 
The guideline VfM interview questions related to interviewees’ understanding of the 
meaning of VfM in PPP, and their perceptions as to how this might be achieved. How-
ever, participants were encouraged to treat the interviews as open. Following this, the 
NVivo version 10 software application was used to conduct a thematic analysis of tran-
script data to identify important themes, using a hierarchical data coding process. Table 
3 presents an overview of VfM categorisations arising from the thematic analysis and 
provides the basis for developing the main findings. 
Table 3: Categorisation of NVivo data – VfM content 
Node Number of references 
Different approaches for achieving VfM 15 
Nature of PPP agreements 6 
Performance VfM definition 4 
Risk VfM definition 5 
Partnership VfM definition 4 
Full project lifecycle VfM definition 24 
Public Sector Comparator  7 
Broader VfM considerations 9 
FINDINGS 
The findings of the thematic data analysis relate to the importance of the business case, 
challenges associated with defining ‘VfM’, the identification of VfM drivers and strate-
gic considerations for managing contractual oversight in delivering VfM outcomes. 
Coded labels reflect the management discipline identities of each interviewee: partner-
ship management focus for interview (PT); risk management focus (RK); and perfor-
mance management focus (PF). 
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Importance of the business case: 
For interviewees PF11, PT08, PT03 and PF01, a precursor to defining ‘VfM’ is to high-
light the criticality of satisfactorily understanding social welfare problems before at-
tempting to solve them through the use of capital asset investment or by other means 
(which should be determined before a PSC instrument is designed and applied and be-
fore a procurement method chosen). For instance, PF11 states that governments ought 
to take a more considered approach when determining ‘why projects should become 
projects’, including identifying the opportunity cost of what they deliver and, just as 
importantly, what such partnerships will not solve. PT03 asserts that in some instances, 
government departments fail to effectively address these issues, including not adequate-
ly identifying broader investment and project benefits. The rationale used in project 
proposals and business cases should thus be properly defensible on these wider grounds 
with all legitimate options being considered. These views are echoed by PF01: 
‘The first decision on any piece of infrastructure isn’t how to procure it. The first 
decision is “what’s the problem?”…It’s all too easy to say that the answer is to 
build something. It’s not so easy to say the answer is not to build something. 
Sometimes people look to infrastructure and then for a problem to solve whereas 
it should be that the problem comes first and then an intervention comes second. 
The intervention may or may not include capital asset investment. It’s not until 
much later down the path that you start talking about how you’re going to buy this 
from the marketplace’. 
Allied to these views, and to deliver VfM outcomes, project proposals and business cas-
es should be considered in context of delivering infrastructure assets for their intended 
purpose as well as the value they will provide to existing networks (PF11; PT08; PF01) 
e.g. how a PPP-procured asset will connect to electrical, hydraulic, transportation net-
works, etc (although it is acknowledged that this cannot not always be the case, particu-
larly with social infrastructure projects e.g. schools and hospitals – there may be merit 
in delivering these types of projects, in isolation to, or in the absence of, existing net-
works). This type of strategic thinking (including adequately defining the benefits de-
rived from it) is identified as a key area for improvement for the public sector (PF11) as 
poorly conceived projects could ultimately result in government paying its private part-
ner hundreds of millions (or even billions) of dollars for under-utilised assets and 
through regular service payments for delivering agreed services that do not fully address 
intended social needs. 
Defining VfM: 
For the interviewees, having a view on how to achieve VfM seems easier to them than 
trying to provide an interpretation of what it means. As a consequence, only a few par-
ticipants (RK10; PT05; PT03; PT08) offered explanations. For RK10, VfM involves 
price, performance and quality, whereby VfM is obtained when ‘the solution drives the 
best price for the best performance for the best outcome’. This differs from the view of 
PT05 who talks about strategic fit and quantification of additional benefits obtained 
from a partnership beyond the financial elements: ‘VfM is quantifying the added extras 
of a partnership over and above the dollars in terms of quality and there is also an ele-
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ment of strategic fit’. The other interviewees frame their definitions by referencing the 
procurement arrangements of two Australian state governments. With regard to the ju-
risdictional aspects, PT03 is inclined to view VfM from a Victorian Government Pur-
chasing Board-style characterisation where VfM is achieved through a ‘balanced as-
sessment of benefits and costs over the whole of life of the investment’ and for PT08, 
VfM is defined by the New South Wales Public Authorities Financial Arrangements 
Act 1987, ‘when the winning bid beats all others and beats the PSC’. 
Interview participants also found it challenging to define ‘VfM’ from partnership and 
performance management perspectives that relate solely to the operational phase of 
PPPs as it is generally considered that the VfM concept is rooted in the entire lifecycle 
of the asset. However, some participants offer VfM considerations that can apply to 
both partnership and performance management during PPP operational governance: 
 Partnership management – VfM may be achieved using the principle of reci-
procity (PT06) i.e. through give and take where both partners may, from time 
to time (and for the right reasons), go ‘above and beyond’ the ‘black letter’ 
approach for each other to attain a desired outcome. In such circumstances 
where relationships work well and the right sorts of people are involved in 
managing the contract, it may be possible to add additional value over time 
e.g. by introducing new technology that has been developed outside of the PPP 
in order to get a better outcome (PT03). Furthermore, VfM can be demonstrat-
ed when the private partner identifies issues or potential issues and brings 
them to the attention of its public partner before they become major challenges 
that could severely impact upon government business (PF03); and 
 Performance management – for the public partner, VfM is sought and obtained 
from its private partner through consistent delivery of contracted services e.g. 
delivering services on time and to agreed standards (PF07) and through effi-
cient and effective public sector contract management oversight (PT05). PF09 
provides a broader view: ‘VfM is…about [the] quality of services offered, per-
formance history, service delivery program, operational support, skilled per-
sonnel, ongoing maintenance and whole of life programs’. 
With respect to risk management, known risks should be continually monitored and 
managed during the operational phase because risk appetite can change over time and 
existing risk positions may not be broken down or be static (RK04). Equally, it is im-
portant to identify the source of new risks, their drivers and to whom the consequences 
(or benefits) flow (RK04). New threat risks, or changes in the severity of previously 
identified risks, can quickly and adversely impact value propositions. Opportunity risks, 
and their exploitation to improve VfM, on the other hand, may arise with far less fre-
quency and make substantial demands on the operational management resources of pub-
lic partners in PPP. 
VfM drivers: 
As part of the wider VfM discussion, a number of interviewees spoke about VfM driv-
ers. Table 4 outlines these. Some relate predominantly to the procurement and delivery 
phases, whilst others are aimed more at the operational phase. 
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Table 4: PPP VfM drivers identified by interview participants 
VfM drivers 
Cost savings/return on 
investment 
‘[VfM is] about getting a competitive rate for what [government] receive[s], which 
needs to take into account the payment of management fees…and locking 
down…maintenance costs’ (PF12). 
‘[VfM is securing] the lowest cost option for the highest benefit…it doesn’t neces-
sary mean the cheapest cost’ (PT02). 
‘VfM isn’t necessarily driven by the dollar…price comes into it because [govern-
ment needs] to buy something – a ten million dollar investment may potentially 
lead to twenty million dollars of value in terms of prestige or improvements…you 
have to look at price in context. It cannot be the sole driver’ (RK10). 
Additional benefits  ‘There are cases where we certainly look for a minimum set of requirements and 
where that might be exceeded as part of an offer of the outcome of the procurement 
process. For example on social infrastructure PPPs, there may be additional com-
mercial elements to the project – it might be retail, it might be food and beverage, it 
might be services that we didn’t brief on, didn’t ask for but may be offered by the 
private partner as a VfM enhancement. We do value that. For us, it is VfM because 
it’s something that we didn’t ask for but it’s something that we could actually like 
or want’ (PT10). 
Productivity gains  ‘The dynamic VfM equation is what you do with the building – it’s the function of 
what you perform out of the building. With office blocks, it’s a relatively simple 
equation. A hospital, prison, court building or school is a much more dynamic 
environment where you’re actually delivering quite sophisticated outcomes that are 
single-purpose…the function is the bigger element’ (RK06). 
‘Having a facility that’s more innovative and creative…actually drives performance 




‘[VfM is about] service standards and how well [the private partner] meet[s] them 
and whether they meet higher service standards than would otherwise occur in the 
public system’ (PT11). 
‘[VfM is assuring] private sector parties are meeting their obligations that are set 
out under the project agreement…and there isn’t slippage or re-framing of issues, 
or weaselling out of payment issues’ (PF13). 
‘VfM is about not having [performance or availability] failures’ (PF03). 
Strategic underpinning of partnering not only extends to the parameters, definition and 
drivers of VfM but also to its measurement. For example, in describing VfM as a long-
term proposition, PT13 states that, in relative terms, value cannot solely be determined 
by calculating a dollar spend on a year-by-year basis during the operational phase. On 
the other hand, measuring VfM, say over the first five years and then assessing how that 
period relates to the next 25 years of the concession, may be a better predictor of VfM 
using both quantitative and qualitative assessments (PF11)). Over and above analysing 
the financial benefits quantitatively, using qualitative assessments may provide greater 
certainty in terms of appraising the quality of relationship between the partners (as it 
should have become well established at that point) e.g. judging how supportive the pri-
vate partner may be in interpreting ambiguous service standards. Such assessment may 
provide useful for public partner decision-making with regard to the potential for im-
proving existing VfM outcomes and/or avoiding costly partnering disputes. 
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Strategic considerations for managing contractual oversight: 
PF01 believes that, as soon as a contract is signed between the public and private part-
ners, there may be an ‘uphill battle’ for the public partner to maintain its intended value 
objectives for the agreement. The attainment of VfM, according to PF01, is dependent 
upon the quality of the individuals involved in discharging their contract management 
responsibilities, defined as the ability to interrogate, question and push-back against the 
commercially-driven aims of the private partner. Thus, attempting to improve expected 
VfM outcomes during the operating phase may be just as challenging, since co-
operation between the public and private partners may depend upon the extent to which 
change will benefit each partner, the motivation of the public partner to revisit value 
propositions over time, or the capability and resourcing of both partners to manage new 
requirements. Moreover, PT06 questions the rationale for seeking VfM enhancements 
during the operating phase over and above what is contracted for, and comments that, 
assuming the private partner is meeting all of the project KPIs, it is not contractually 
required to do anything more unless it wishes to do so. 
Generally speaking, the interviewees who are inclined to adopt a give and take approach 
to operational management of PPPs (PF03; PT10; RK09; RK05; PT11; PF14; PF06; 
PF07; PF10) emphasise the significance of partners ‘working together’ to achieve mu-
tually beneficial outcomes (PF06), particularly when there is something in the contract 
that cannot be easily enforced e.g. loosely worded KPIs that are subject to different in-
terpretations. In such circumstances, PF07 suggests that the best course of action may 
be to take a co-operative, solutions-orientated approach; an approach that engenders 
‘commercial fairness’ and mutual gain rather than trying to force an outcome where one 
party benefits at the other’s expense (PF10). Working together in this way may lead to 
issues being resolved more easily and flexibly (PT11) without the need for formal dis-
pute resolution clauses in concession agreements to be enacted. As PT10 explains: 
‘In this department, it’s traditionally been that the contract is important but it’s on-
ly used as a last resort. We’re interested in the 25-30 year partnership element – 
that’s what the public sector client tends to go into these for…strategic relation-
ships. We’re looking for a long-term partner for long-term service delivery.’ 
DISCUSSION 
Although defining the concept of ‘VfM’ is clearly a subjective task, three broad themes 
emerge from the interview finding that, if adequately managed, can contribute to VfM 
achievement: the adoption of a flexible approach by the public partner for managing 
contractual oversight; how performance during the operating phase can be assessed (and 
improved if necessary); and how public employee capability and expertise in monitor-
ing and managing desired VfM outcomes can be improved. 
Adopting a flexible approach for achieving VfM outcomes: 
Organisational culture, including selecting a practical approach for managing contract 
oversight, is likely to impact on whether intended VfM outcomes are achieved (Ed-
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wards, Bowen and Stewart 2005; Ernst & Young 2008, p.13; National Audit Office 
2009, pp.54-55; Weihe in Hodge, Greve and Boardman 2010, p.520) during the operat-
ing phase of PPPs. This claim is supported by the interview findings. It appears that in 
practice, the realisation of VfM will require active management of tension that exists 
between the need for better partnership relations i.e. using a ‘give and take’ approach, or 
using a more formal, compliance-oriented i.e. a ‘black-letter’ approach to achieve stated 
outcomes. The degree to which one approach is selected over the other should depend 
on specific circumstances; decision-making can have far-reaching consequences and 
associated risks ought to be properly assessed. The challenge of selecting the right ap-
proach is articulated by RK05: 
‘Focusing on managing the contract to the exclusion of managing the relationship 
is likely to result in a loss of opportunities to improve VfM outcomes. Conversely, 
focusing on managing the relationship to the exclusion of managing the contract is 
likely to undermine a party's legal position and hence also detract from VfM. The 
key is to manage both the contract and relationship in a way that promotes VfM 
outcomes’. 
From a performance management perspective, it may, under certain circumstances, be 
preferable for the private partner to be given an opportunity to resolve operational laps-
es rather than the public partner rigidly applying abatement for all instances of under-
performance to encourage positive working relationships. In other words, knowing 
when to apply abatement and when to allow flexibility can be strategically important 
with respect to building and maintaining effective partnership relations. Such flexibility, 
however, should not occur to the detriment of longer-term achievement of VfM out-
comes. 
In addition to applying mechanisms for reducing negative behaviour and/or under-
performance, public partner decision-makers should encourage positive behaviour in 
their partner through incentives that drive the ‘right performance’ culture (PF05). An 
example of this type of behaviour is, and defined by PF03, as where the private partner 
performs ‘above and beyond the call of duty’ – such as beating minimum response 
times for asset maintenance. Such behaviour may foster a stronger ‘working together’ 
culture between partners, and if consistently displayed by the private partner and suffi-
ciently recognised by the public partner, this type of value adding could be formally 
recorded e.g. in a performance register, and used as part of wider criteria for assessing 
the feasibility of contract variations, for instance, or even future project tenders. 
Flexible attitudes may also reduce the potential for serious conflict, where one partner 
fails to meet the expectations of the other e.g. where the intent of a service specification 
has been misunderstood or where a KPI has not been adequately defined. Disputes can 
occur because the private partner has a different idea of the service it is supposed to be 
delivering or how wording contained in contractual clauses should be interpreted. Dif-
ferent perceptions and interpretations can therefore have a profound effect on achieving 
VfM outcomes where the ‘word’ can outlive the ‘intent’ in agreements. 
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Assessing VfM during the operating phase: 
An effective way for the public partner to hold its private partner accountable for per-
formance is through the continuous application of contract administration and undertak-
ing periodic strategic assessments to determine if VfM outcomes are being achieved. 
Without a strong understanding of the PPP service delivery environment, public partner 
contract managers will find it difficult to accurately evaluate operational performance 
(Edwards et al 2004: p.49). Therefore contract managers should develop pro-active ap-
proaches to ensure VfM propositions are maintained over time. Performance evaluation 
should be ongoing with the data collected potentially being used as a basis for develop-
ing control actions and managing emerging risks. This is particularly relevant where the 
private partner fails to maintain expected service standards, as stipulated under conces-
sion deeds, that then lead to penalty clauses being activated. 
Interview participants (PF12; PF08; PT11; PF14; PT12; PF02; PF05; RK10) point to a 
variety of ways that performance/progress can be measured against the attainment of 
stated PPP outcomes during operations. These include: 
 Reviewing progress against the public interest template – although these types 
of assessments are normally undertaken during conceptualisation and business 
case development, PT11 argues that such analysis could extend to the opera-
tional phase for determining whether the rights of users and consumers are still 
being protected as intended; 
 Reviewing progress against business case objectives/justifications for contract 
amendments – despite being potentially effective ways to assess performance, 
PT11 and PT12 assert that government is not always proficient at conducting 
these types of appraisals. PPPs are, however, subject to the Gateway Review 
Process in Victoria (including Gate Six: Benefits Realisation – see Victorian 
Department of Treasury and Finance 2009) as well as in other Australian 
states; 
 Reviewing progress against operational objectives – there may be certain ob-
jectives that have not been clearly established in business cases, or contracts, 
that government wants to track such as user satisfaction levels (PF08; RK10) 
by monitoring and measuring the quality of users’ experiences; and 
 Ex-post evaluations – in the UK, PPPs should undergo ex-post evaluations, for 
example, to assess the quality of the contract management function after hand-
back (termination of a concession). However, this rarely happens in practice 
(PF14), and the recency of the use of PPP procurement does not yet yield a 
sufficient sample of completed concessions to explore the benefits of such 
evaluation. This means that valuable lessons learned that could be applied to 
other PPPs are being lost (or are not yet accessible) and that avoidable, costly 
mistakes are probably being repeated in other projects. 
In all the interviews, it was clear that participants were more comfortable, and familiar, 
in dealing with the objective and measurable aspects of VfM. The more intangible pub-
lic benefits sought in PPPs were less frequently raised by interviewees. 
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Delivering VfM through improved public employee capability and expertise:  
The third theme relates to raising public employee capability, expertise (Edwards et al 
2004, p.63; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2007, p.20) and 
accountability (RK06; PF12; PT10) in managing oversight of PPP contracts to achieve 
intended VfM outcomes. 
Broadly speaking, performance and compliance can be improved through enforcing 
accountability and responsibility of management staff. For instance, employee perfor-
mance and capability can be benchmarked against job descriptions as well as relevant 
outputs and outcomes specified in contract management manuals to assess the extent to 
which staff are effectively discharging their duties, with review forming part of regular 
employee appraisal processes. If the private partner is accountable to its stakeholders 
and shareholders for monitoring its own performance, service delivery outputs should 
be tested/validated by the public partner against the concessionaire’s contractual obliga-
tions (even if a trusting relationship exists between the partners, it is prudent for the 
public partner – as custodian of VfM for the state – to ensure that the declared level of 
performance actually matches what has been delivered). This could include, for exam-
ple, adherence to agreed policies, frameworks and procedures; progress made against 
work plans and technical assessments e.g. public safety reviews; the achievement of 
outputs and outcomes against KPIs and milestones; improvement made to the delivery 
of services arising from stakeholder feedback; and the implementation of audit recom-
mendations. Other types of review could include periodic reviews to assess the level of 
progress made with regard to the achievement project business case objec-
tives/justifications made for amending the contract; and overseeing benchmarking and 
competitive market testing to determine the relative quality and competitiveness of ex-
isting services with that of similar providers (although review mechanisms exist in con-
tracts, testing may not always take place, in practice (PT05)). Many of these assessment 
processes require high levels of expertise to implement; proficiencies that may not be 
immediately nor consistently available through contracting out the assessment services 
to external consultants or contractors. 
A further potential risk for the public partner, in relying too heavily on external contrac-
tors and consultants, is that they may not adequately (or be requested to) transfer appro-
priate technical knowledge to public employees (PT05), nor do so in a timely way, 
which may result in the public partner paying high market rates for longer than neces-
sary or being left unexpectedly to deal with skills-gaps if external providers should 
leave suddenly. The public partner can bolster its contract management capabilities by 
distilling and documenting key commercial and project learning. This may include de-
veloping better knowledge continuity between project phases; creating and maintaining 
a document library for corporate and commercial documents; applying the contract 
management/administration manual more effectively; and improving succession plan-
ning and hand-over processes. On a wider scale, sharing of PPP information, knowledge 
and wisdom between public sector bodies would enhance public governance capability 
for PPP. 
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Although weighted towards a compliance-orientated approach to contract management, 
there may be merit in using a ‘calendar of deliverables’ to support junior public partner 
contract managers in managing tasks as specified under a concession deed. This is sug-
gested by PF12 and derives from direct experience in designing and implementing an 
Access database for employees to use that links each task with a corresponding delivery 
date – a systematic approach that also involves assessing and then reporting on the ex-
tent to which each obligation is met using a pre-defined methodology. According to 
PF12, such a system can easily be configured to meet the requirements of individual 
PPP contracts in a way that ‘takes users step-by-step through what they need to do, how 
it should be done and when to do it’. Furthermore, this type of approach is beneficial for 
mitigating some of the knowledge and experiential risks that the public partner faces; it 
can be used to build corporate, commercial and project knowledge; and be used to raise 
levels of accountability and performance of both contract management team members 
and the private partner. 
A number of interviewees raised the subject of appropriate monetary reward for high 
public sector employee performance i.e. using financial incentives. PT06, for example, 
stated that for government to obtain and then retain experienced and capable project 
directors, remuneration ought to be competitive with that offered by the private sector. 
However, in practice, this may not be the case as at an Australian state level, pay levels 
do vary significantly (PT11). This implies differences between jurisdictions as well as 
staff awards in different contract management environments within the same state. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is essential that the public partner provides effective contract management oversight 
during the operating phase of PPP to ensure intended VfM outcomes are achieved. 
Analysis of interview data, gathered from appropriate experts both in Australia and the 
UK, demonstrates that the adoption of a flexible approach for achieving VfM; the selec-
tion and application of appropriate techniques for assessing VfM during the operating 
phase; and improving public employee capability and expertise in delivering VfM are 
key issues for attaining planned outcomes for tax payers. Less tangible PPP perfor-
mance benefits should be more clearly articulated to contract managers so that they can 
be more explicitly drawn into the operational management process. 
Further attention could usefully be given to whether there are jurisdictional patterns 
between the adoption of the public partner’s preferred contract management style for 
achieving VfM and organisational culture during the operating phase in separate pro-
jects, particularly in mature PPP markets. Such research should focus on identifying 
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critical success factors and their drivers, and the evidence that points towards achieve-
ment of VfM outcomes for each PPP project. 
LIMITATIONS AND CONTRIBUTION 
This research adopts an intentional perspective on the operating phase of PPP and the 
public partner’s involvement in this. This means that other PPP project phases (pro-
curement, delivery and concession termination), which may have significant bearing on 
achieving VfM outcomes, are not dealt with. 
The research contributes to the advancement of the ‘body of knowledge’, with respect to 
public partner governance of PPP in the operating phase by identifying critical success 
factors that lead to the achievement of VfM outcomes, thus building upon existing 
knowledge, policy and guidance of PPPs. This was achieved by conducting an in-depth 
qualitative study involving 34 interview participants working in Australian and interna-
tional PPP markets. Given the experience of the participants, these views carry substan-
tial weight. 
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